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Abstract
This paper examines why transition from planned to market economies in the countries of
the former Soviet bloc has changed their mix and volumes of food consumption.  During
transition, consumption of high value products, such as meat and dairy products, has plummeted,
while consumption of staple foods such as bread and potatoes has remained steady, or even
increased.  The paper shows that in the pre-reform planned economy, planners “desired” the
production and national consumption of high value (and cost) foodstuffs more than consumers.
When market reform resulted in consumer prices adjusting to reflect the full cost of production,
consumer demand switched from high cost foods to other goods and services.  The demand-
driven nature of food restructuring in these countries has implications for food security,
reinforcing the argument that any food security problems are not mainly the result of inadequate
aggregate supplies of agricultural products.
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1. Introduction
Economic transition in the countries of the former Soviet bloc has substantially
restructured their commodity agriculture, the main effect being a large drop in production and
consumption of meat and other high value products.  The fall in food production and
consumption has raised concerns within certain countries about food security, which their
agricultural establishments have used to lobby strongly for increased support and protection for
agriculture.  Although Macours and Swinnen and Liefert and Swinnen examine how transition
has affected countries’ commodity agriculture, their focus is on production rather than
consumption effects.
This paper examines how and why transition has changed the structure of countries’ food3
consumption.  The paper first presents a conceptual framework, then empirical analysis, and
lastly policy implications of the results.  The main causal factors examined in the consumption
restructuring are the shift from planners’ to consumers’ preferences as the dominant force in
determining what goods are produced and consumed, trade liberalization, and the transition-
induced drop in real consumer income.
2. Conceptual Framework
Figure 1 is used to examine how transition from a planned to a market economy affects a
country’s commodity structure of consumption.  The curve concave to the origin is the
economy’s production possibilities frontier (PPF) for goods G
1 and G
2.  We extend the concept
of economy-wide social indifference maps for consumers to include an indifference map for
planners in the aggregate.  In our analysis, planners receive utility from goods from the various
ways they put them to use within their overall plan for the economy.  We assume that in the
planned economy, planners and consumers have different preferences for goods, represented by








3 are specific indifference curves within the
indifference curve maps for planners and consumers, respectively.  Assuming that the planners
are utility maximizers, the planned economy’s production and consumption point is A, where the
planners’ indifference curve U
p
1 is tangent to the PPF.
Transition has two inherent features that can fundamentally alter the structure of a
country’s production and consumption.  The first is that consumers’ preferences replace
planners’ preferences as the dominant force in determining what goods are produced and
consumed.  The switch in indifference maps moves the production and consumption point from
A to B.  The second feature is trade liberalization.   In figure 1, the international trade price ratio
is given by the slope of line TT.  With free trade, the economy’s consumption possibilities4
frontier (CPF) shifts from the PPF to line TT.  The economy’s production point shifts to C, and
its consumption point to E.  The country exports G
2 and imports G
1.
3. Empirical Analysis
In the pre-reform period, the countries of the former Soviet bloc were consuming foods at
per capita levels equal to those in rich Western countries (table 1).  This was true even for high
value livestock products, such as meat and milk.  By the late 1990s (5-10 years into economic
reform), per capita consumption of livestock products had fallen substantially.  On the other
hand, consumption of staple foods such as bread and potatoes remained steady, or even
increased.  In figure 1, transition reduces consumption of G
1 and raises consumption of G
2.
Therefore, in our use of figure 1 to examine how transition has affected food consumption, G
1
represents high value foods and G
2 all other goods.
3.1. Shift from planners’ to consumers’ preferences.  The main cause of the
restructuring of consumption during transition, and in particular the drop in consumption of high
value livestock products, has been the shift from planners’ to consumers’ preferences as the
dominant force in determining what goods are produced and consumed.  We wish to show that
before transition, planners “desired” the production and national consumption of high value
livestock products more than consumers (at the margin).  This accounts in figure 1 for the
relative shapes given for the planners’ and consumers’ indifference curves.
Beginning in the early 1970s, the USSR began to expand the livestock sector, a policy
generally copied by the other countries of the Soviet bloc.  The policy succeeded, such that by
1990 livestock herds and meat production in these countries were about 50 percent higher than in
1970.  Because the main reason for expanding the livestock sector was to improve consumers’
standard of living by increasing consumption of high-value livestock products, governments did
not want consumers to have to pay the high cost of livestock production.  Thus, consumer prices5
for livestock goods were set far below production cost.   In 1986, the aggregate ratio of producer
to consumer prices for livestock products in the USSR, Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary was about 2.0, 1.8, 1.45, and 1.35, respectively (computed from ERS).
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Massive subsidies to both producers and consumers were required to cover the gap.  By
1990, state budget subsidies to the agro-food economy in the USSR equaled about 10 percent of
GDP (World Bank, p. 138), with the bulk going to the livestock sector.  By 1990, per capita
consumption of meat and other livestock products in the USSR and other bloc countries was on a
level equal to that in many rich Western countries, such as Great Britain (table 1).  Since per
capita income in these Western countries was much higher than in the Soviet bloc countries, the
latter were producing and consuming livestock products at a much higher level than one would
predict based on their real income (Sedik).  Further evidence that these countries were
overconsuming livestock products relative to their real income is that in the more successfully
reforming transition economies whose GDP has surpassed the pre-reform level, consumption of
livestock products is below pre-reform levels.  In 2000 per capita GDP in Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic was 43, 12, and 10 percent higher than in 1990 (PlanEcon), while per capita
consumption of meat was 4, 12, and 24 percent lower, respectively (FAO).
The main reform policy that effected the move from planners’ to consumers’ preferences,
thereby moving the production and consumption point in figure 1 from A to B, was price
liberalization, accompanied by the slashing of subsidies to producers and consumers.  These
policy changes resulted in consumer prices jumping to reflect the high costs of production.
Faced with higher prices, consumers switched their demand away from high value (and cost)
foods.   Reform in fact created entirely new goods and, in particular, services (ranging from legal
and financial services to car repair and health clubs), which consumers were starved of under the
old regime and to which demand has turned during reform.  The appearance of new consumer6
goods and services during transition could in fact change the indifference map of consumers by
altering the shape of the indifference curves, most likely in a way that further distinguished them
from the planners’ indifference curves.
To prove that planners “desired” the production and national consumption of livestock
products more than consumers (at the margin), we must show that during the planned period, the
ratio of the marginal utility of livestock goods to the marginal utility of all other goods was
higher for planners than for consumers.  As mentioned before, in figure 1 G
1 represents high
value foods such as livestock products and G
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cost of producing G
1, G
2.  All the variables are defined for the pre-reform planned period.  We











In terms of figure 1, equation (1) means that the planners’ indifference curve that passes through
point A (U
p
1) is steeper at that point than is the consumers’ indifference curve that passes
through point A (U
c
1).
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The “producer prices” used to compute the ratios of producer to consumer prices for countries’
agricultural goods given earlier are producer incentive prices; that is, they include per unit state
budget subsidies to producers, and thereby cover the full cost of production.  This means that in
equation (2), the producer prices are incentive prices, such that we can assume that the ratio of
the goods’ MC equals the ratio of the goods’ producer (incentive) prices.  Concerning equation7
(3), although in the planned economies planners determined the quantities and prices of goods
made available for consumption, consumers were free to purchase these goods as they chose.
Equation (3) gives the consumer welfare maximizing condition.
It was shown earlier that pre-reform, producer prices for agricultural goods in general,
and livestock products in particular, exceeded their consumer prices, or in terms of our notation,
P
1
p  >  P
1
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The distance in figure 1 between the planners’ and consumers’ optimal
production/consumption points (A and B) for the former Soviet bloc countries is even greater
than that implied by the values given for the ratios of producer to consumer prices for foodstuffs.
When price liberalization began in these countries, agricultural producers’ terms of trade (output
prices relative to input prices) deteriorated substantially.  For example, from 1989 to 1995,
agricultural producers’ terms of trade in Poland and Hungary worsened by 73 and 36 percent,
respectively, while in Russia, Ukraine, and Romania they deteriorated over 1990-95 by 77, 76,
and 66 percent, respectively (computed from OECD).  This shows that during the planned
period, agricultural input prices (such as for energy, fertilizer, and animal feed) were set low,
relative to both output prices and to the real cost of producing the inputs.  In the planned
economy, agricultural producers were subsidized not only directly through state budget
subsidies, but also indirectly through the price system.
The increase in the relative prices of agricultural inputs once prices were free to move to
levels that reflected full production costs means that during the planned period, agricultural
output prices were also understated relative to output prices for other goods.  In other words, in
equations (2) and (4), MC
1 is not equal to, but rather is greater than, P
1
p.  This means that
MC
1  >  P
1
p  >  P
1
c .  This pushes the planners’ production/consumption point A further down (to8
the right) on the PPF than is implied by the ratios of pre-reform producer to consumer prices for
foodstuffs.  In turn, MC
1/MC




c by a magnitude greater than is implied by the price
ratios.  The degree to which production and consumption of high cost livestock products would
fall during transition is therefore also greater than that implied by the price ratios.
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3.2. Trade liberalization.  The second main feature of the movement from a planned to a
market economy that affected the structure of production and consumption was trade
liberalization.  In planned economies, foreign trade was a state monopoly.  Although most
planned economies did trade, it was to a much lower degree than market economies.  (When
discussing the behavior of a planned economy in the Conceptual Framework section of the
paper, for simplicity we ignored foreign trade.)  The requirement of central planning that output
targets and input requirements must balance motivated planners to think in autarkic terms.  Trade
was used not to maximize the gains from trade according to comparative advantage, but as a
necessary evil to correct resource shortages within the plan (see Holzman).
In figure 1, trade liberalization shifts the production point from B to C, and the
consumption point from B to E.  If in figure 1 G
1 represents high value agricultural products, the
country has a comparative disadvantage in these goods.  The reason is that the slope of the line
tangent to the PPF at point B (which gives the opportunity cost of producing one more unit of G
1
in terms of units of G
2 foregone) is greater than the ratio of the foreign trade prices of G
1 to G
2,
as given by the slope of the trade line TT.  Trade liberalization results in imports of G
1.
The empirical evidence shows that when the transition countries liberalized their foreign
trade, they generally were uncompetitive in agricultural goods, and especially livestock products.
The main evidence is that domestic producer prices for livestock products, and agricultural goods
in general, lay above world prices (OECD).  Liefert more specifically finds that during transition,
Russia has had a general comparative disadvantage in producing agricultural output (meat and9
grain) compared to agricultural inputs (energy, fertilizer, and animal feed for livestock), as well
as a comparative disadvantage in meat compared to grain.  Trade liberalization has therefore
resulted in the transition economies moving more toward imports rather than exports of
foodstuffs, with many countries becoming large importers.  For example,  Russia’s meat imports
rose from 0.71 million metric tons (mmt) in 1992 to 2.70 mmt in 2001 (USDA).
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The transition countries’ uncompetitiveness in agricultural products during transition has
reinforced the drop in agricultural output resulting from the move to consumers’ preferences, as
measured in figure 1 by the further shift in the production point from B to C.  Yet, given that
trade liberalization has made the transition countries largely importers rather than exporters of
agricultural products, it has increased consumption of many foodstuffs.  In figure 1, trade
liberalization has the isolated effect of raising consumption of G
1, by the horizontal distance
between points B and E.  This has mitigated the drop in food consumption resulting from the
move from planners’ to consumers’ preferences.  For example, although per capita meat
consumption in Russia in 2001 was about 40 percent lower than in 1990, imports supplied 40
percent of all meat consumed (in volume terms; USDA).  Without trade, meat consumption
would be much lower.
3.3. Drop in real consumer income.  In addition to the move to consumers’ preferences
and trade liberalization, transition can also affect food consumption by changing real consumer
income.  In almost all transition countries, real income has fallen, in many cases substantially
(PlanEcon).  For example, for Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria, official statistics show that 2001
per capita income was down compared to the pre-reform period by half or more (PlanEcon).
One reason is an inevitable rise in unemployment, as jobs are lost at a faster pace than new jobs
can be created.  In figure 1, this would be represented by the “temporary” movement of
production to a point within the PPF, say to F.10
Another major reason for the decline in real income, however, is price liberalization.  In
virtually every transition country, price liberalization resulted in consumer prices rising by a
much larger percentage than nominal wages or income, such that real incomes fell.  Countries’
macroeconomic statistics show that for almost every country, most of the drop in real consumer
income during transition occurred in the single year when price liberalization was implemented
(about 25 percent for Poland in 1991 and the Czech Republic in 1991, and about 50 percent for
Russia in 1992 and Ukraine in 1993; PlanEcon).  Consumer purchasing power fell, though not
because of an immediate and accompanying decline in the economy’s real national product.
Rather, just as price liberalization resulted in output prices jumping to reflect real production
costs, it also resulted in consumer purchasing power adjusting to reflect the country’s real
income and wealth, as measured by its ability to produce goods valued at their real cost of
production.  This means that much (if not most) of the decline in consumer income, and
accompanying shift in demand for goods, sprang from the move from planners’ to consumers’
preferences, rather than from the transition-induced rise in unemployment.  Thus, although the
consumption effect of the drop in real income is reflected in figure 1 in part by movement of the
production point to F within the PPF, much of the effect is reflected by movement of the
production point along the PPF from A towards B.
That a move from planners’ to consumers’ preferences for goods, which should increase
consumer welfare, is associated with a drop in consumer income might seem contradictory.
Much of the contradiction is resolved by recognizing that during transition, the fall in consumer
income, as conventionally measured, has been overstated.  Because of difficulties in obtaining
prices for new goods and services, as well as inertia in state statistical agencies, the basket of
goods whose prices are used to compute the income changes largely reflect the goods more
desired by the pre-reform planners than consumers.  In particular, the basket excludes most of11
the new consumer goods and services that have arisen as markets have developed and to which
demand has switched during transition.  Real consumer income, purchasing power, and welfare
from consumption have fallen less than the official statistics indicate.
Nonetheless, the decline in real consumer income and purchasing power from price
liberalization plays a role in the restructuring of consumption.  One reason for the drop in
consumer demand for high value foodstuffs has been a substitution away from them as their
prices rose.  But the decrease in real consumer income has also created an income effect.
Because livestock products have relatively high income elasticities of demand, demand for them
has fallen substantially.  Demand for staple foodstuffs with low income elasticities of demand,
such as bread and potatoes, has dropped only little.  In some countries, consumption of these
staples has in fact increased (table 1), which suggests that during transition they could be inferior
goods.
Another way transition could change consumer income is from technological change.
Transition could generate technology transfer, facilitated by foreign direct investment, as well as
exposure to superior foreign management practices.  On the production side, technological
improvement would increase productivity, thereby shifting the economies’ PPF outward, while
on the consumption side it would raise consumer income.  This would disproportionately
increase demand for livestock products and other foods with high income elasticities of demand.
Yet, given that real consumer income in most countries is still below the pre-reform level, any
isolated rise in consumer income from technological progress to date probably has not been
large, and has been dominated by the negative income effects of transition.
4. Policy Implications
The main policy implication of our analysis is that most of the fall in agricultural12
production and consumption during transition is an inevitable, and thereby irreversible,
consequence of market reform (unless reform itself is reversed).  Consumption of high value
foods will rise to pre-reform levels only if economy-wide productivity growth over time raises
consumer income, thereby supporting greater demand for relatively expensive high value foods.
No short to medium term effects intrinsic to the reform process will substantially increase
consumption of these foods.  This point takes issue with the argument commonly made by these
countries’ agricultural establishments that the contraction of agriculture is a temporary, though
disastrous, effect of the dislocations of transition, an assertion used to support lobbying for large
assistance to producers in the form of subsidies or trade protection.  A qualification is that some
of the drop in food consumption is the result of the short run frictional unemployment of
transition, such that consumption could rebound as employment and incomes rise.  Yet, as
argued before, much if not most of the decline in real consumer income during transition has
resulted not from unemployment, but rather from “irreversible” price liberalization.
The second major policy conclusion is that the causes of food insecurity in these
countries could be misidentified, and concerns about food security exaggerated.  Many observers
in both the transition countries and the West have used the decline in agricultural production and
per capita food consumption as evidence by itself of a food security problem.  The argument of
inadequate overall food supplies has buttressed support for Western food aid.
4  Yet, consumption
has fallen for high value foods, not for staple foods such as bread and potatoes.  Although some
transition countries do have food security problems, the main reason is not deficient overall food
supplies.  Rather, the major causes appear to be inadequate purchasing power by the poor, as
well as problems in moving foodstuffs to deficit-producing regions (Russia being a good
example; see Liefert and Liefert).13
5. Conclusion
This paper argues that the main reason for the drop in consumption of meat and other
high value foods in transition economies has been the shift from planners’ to consumers’
preferences as the dominant force in determining what goods are produced and consumed.
Empirical evidence is used to show that in the pre-reform period, planners desired the production
and national consumption of high value (and cost) foods more than consumers (at the margin).
The main evidence is that in the pre-reform period, producer prices for high value foodstuffs lay
above consumer prices.  Under standard assumptions of economic rationality for both planners
and consumers, this means that the ratio of planners’ marginal utilities of high value foods to
other goods exceeded the ratio for consumers.
One policy implication is that the fall in production and consumption of high value
foodstuffs during transition has been an inevitable, and therefore irreversible, part of market
reform.  Another policy implication is that the causes of food insecurity could be misidentified,
and concerns about food insecurity exaggerated.  The decline in food production and
consumption has reinforced the misconception that a major factor in any food security problems
is inadequate overall food supplies.  On the contrary, the main causes of food insecurity appear
to be deficient purchasing power by the poor and obstacles to moving foodstuffs to deficit-
producing regions within countries.14
Endnotes
1 Because consumer retail prices for foods include costs for processing and distribution as well as
the cost of primary agricultural production, the “consumer prices” used to compute this ratio are
the prices paid by the immediate purchasers of the primary agricultural products (typically
processors).  Policy in most countries of the former Soviet bloc (following that of the USSR) was
to apply the subsidies to agriculture specifically at the processing stage, such that processors’
purchaser prices were below the prices received by agricultural producers.
2 This point complicates the argument that planners “desired” high value foods more than
consumers, because the complex price system during the planned period whereby prices could
understate costs means that planners might have been unaware of the real opportunity cost of
goods.  In other words, the planners themselves might not have known the degree to which they
favored the production of high cost foodstuffs compared to consumers.
3 An exception is that because of the large contraction of their livestock sectors, the countries of
the former Soviet Union have terminated the large imports of grain, soybeans, and soybean meal
needed during the Soviet period to help feed the country’s growing livestock herds.  Rather than
importing feed to maintain high cost livestock production, Russia and other countries are now
heavily importing meat and other animal products.
4 During the 1990s, the United States and EU gave food aid to a number of transition economies,
including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan.
The biggest recipient in recent years has been Russia, which in 1999-2000 received 3.1 and 1.8
million metric tons of food aid from the United States and EU, the main aid commodity being
grain (Liefert and Liefert).15
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Figure 1: Transition's Effect on Production and Consumption
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